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ABSTRACT
Power grids are undergoing major changes due to rapid growth
in renewable energy resources and improvements in battery
technology. While these changes enhance sustainability and
efficiency, they also create significant management challenges
as the complexity of power systems increases. To tackle these
challenges, decentralized Internet-of-Things (IoT) solutions
are emerging, which arrange local communities into transac-
tive microgrids. Within a transactive microgrid, “prosumers”
(i.e., consumers with energy generation and storage capabil-
ities) can trade energy with each other, thereby smoothing
the load on the main grid using local supply. It is hard, how-
ever, to provide security, safety, and privacy in a decentralized
and transactive energy system. On the one hand, prosumers’
personal information must be protected from their trade part-
ners and the system operator. On the other hand, the system
must be protected from careless or malicious trading, which
could destabilize the entire grid. This paper describes Privacy-
preserving Energy Transactions (PETra), which is a secure
and safe solution for transactive microgrids that enables con-
sumers to trade energy without sacrificing their privacy. PETra
builds on distributed ledgers, such as blockchains, and pro-
vides anonymity for communication, bidding, and trading.
ACM Classification Keywords
K.6.m Miscellaneous: Security; D.4.7 Organization and De-
sign: Distributed systems
Author Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
Power grids are undergoing major changes due to rapid accel-
eration in renewable energy resources, such as wind and solar
power [24]. For example, 4,143 megawatts of solar panels
were installed in the third quarter of 2016 [1]. This capacity
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is estimated to grow from 4% in 2015 to 29% in 2040 [20].
The massive integration of renewable energy requires detailed
information and visibility into all aspects of the network, mak-
ing it hard to manage, especially in the presence of variable
distributed energy resources [14]. A different vision for the
future of power-grid operations is therefore emerging: a de-
centralized system in which local communities are arranged
in microgrids [18]. In this vision, energy generation, transmis-
sion, distribution, and even storage (e.g., electric vehicles in
a community) can be strategically used to balance load and
demand spikes.
Furthering the concept of microgrids, transactive energy mod-
els have been proposed to support the next distribution system
evolution [13, 16]. Transactive energy is a set of market-based
constructs for dynamically balancing the demand and sup-
ply across the electrical infrastructure [16]. In this approach,
prosumers1 on the same feeder (i.e., those sharing a power
line link) can operate in an open market, trading and exchang-
ing generated energy locally. Distribution System Operators
(DSOs) can be the custodians of this market, while still meet-
ing the net demand [5]. For example, the Brooklyn Microgrid
(brooklynmicrogrid.com) is a peer-to-peer market for locally
generated renewable energy, which was developed by LO3
Energy as a pilot project.
On one hand, transactive energy is a decentralized power
system controls problem [14], requiring strategic microgrid
control to maintain the stability of the community and the
utility. On the other hand, it is a distributed market problem
where erroneous—as well as malicious—transactions can cre-
ate a gap between demand and supply, eventually destabilizing
the system. In both cases, however, this system requires a
distributed infrastructure comprising smart meters, feeders,
smart inverters, utility substations, the utility central offices,
and the transmission system operator, which must provide the
necessary computation fabric to support the interplay between
the energy control and the fiscal market challenges. Recently,
demand-response systems have been enabled as IoT applica-
tions in smart grids [10]. The transactive grid described in this
paper is the next step in the evolution of energy systems [4].
In general, the focus is now on creating a distributed IoT
infrastructure that provides the necessary computation fabric
1We refer to customers as prosumers to emphasize that they can not
only consume energy, but may also produce it.
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to support the interplay between energy control and fiscal
market challenges, as shown by Volttron [12], OpenFMB [9],
and the Resilient Information Architecture Platform for Smart
Grid (RIAPS) [8, 7]. For instance, the latter is a distributed
IoT operating system that provides the foundations for all
algorithms, isolates the hardware details from the algorithms,
and provides essential mechanisms for resource management,
fault tolerance, and security. Most of these efforts, however,
focus on the computation and distribution of information, and
do not provide the support required to handle the privacy
challenges that arise from the required information exchange
in this decentralized transactive system.
This paper assumes the existence of a distributed IoT infras-
tructure and focuses on the following privacy challenges:
• Leakage of energy usage patterns to other prosumers
Since prosumers may purchase energy from each other in
a transactive microgrid, transactions may inadvertently re-
veal the prosumers’ detailed energy usage patterns to other
prosumers within the microgrid. Addressing this issue in a
decentralized trading system is hard as it requires hiding the
identities of trade partners from each other. In comparison,
secure smart metering reveals the prosumers’ energy usage
patterns only to the operator.
• Inference of future states of a prosumer Transactions
may reveal the future energy usage of a prosumer, which
could be used to infer private information. For example, a
smart home may know that its inhabitants will go out in
the evening (e.g., by looking at their calendar), and it may
trade energy futures accordingly in the morning. Without
adequate privacy measures, these trades may reveal to other
prosumers in the microgrid that the inhabitants will not be
at home later. Note that energy futures, whose delivery may
happen several hours after when the transaction is made,
can play an important role in predicting and controlling
microgrid load. In comparison, smart metering reveals only
current (or past) usage.
• Personally identifiable information Transactions and en-
ergy usage data in a transactive microgrid are much richer
sources of information than the simple usage data collected
by smart meters. In particular, the information available
in a transactive microgrid is a superset of what is available
from smart metering and may be used to infer personal
information, such as risk propensity and financial standing.
Before transactive energy systems can be deployed widely in
practice, the privacy issues described above must be addressed.
Addressing these issues is hard, however, since solutions must
also satisfy security and safety requirements, which often con-
flict with privacy goals. For example, to prevent a prosumer
from destabilizing the system through careless of malicious
energy trading, a transactive grid must check all of the pro-
sumer’s transactions. In a decentralized system, these checks
require disseminating information, which could be used to
infer the prosumer’s future energy consumption.
This paper introduces Privacy-preserving Energy Transactions
(PETra), which is our distributed-ledger based solution that
(1) enables trading energy futures in a secure and verifiable
manner, (2) preserves prosumer privacy, and (3) enables DSOs
to regulate trading and enforce certain safety rules. This paper
is organized as follows: we first describe the basic components
of a transactive IoT microgrid and formulate security, safety,
and privacy requirements; we next introduce PETra and de-
scribe the transactions and services used to implement it; we
then discuss how it satisfies the security, safety, and privacy
requirements; finally, we describe related work and present
concluding remarks.
SYSTEM MODEL AND REQUIREMENTS
This section describes a basic system model of transactive IoT
microgrids and formulates security, safety, and privacy require-
ments. A microgrid is a collection of prosumers (residential
nodes) that are arranged within the same distribution feeder
and support exchange of power between them. A prosumer
node typically includes a smart inverter and a smart meter,
which control the flow of power into and out of the prosumer.
A microgrid also typically contains a set of protection nodes
that are responsible for isolating faults on the feeder. The
Distribution System Operator (DSO) operates switching nodes
to control the connection of the microgrid to the rest of the
distribution system. The DSO is responsible for regulating the
net electric power into and out of the microgrid. Starting from
this model, we next introduce the transactive microgrid model.
Transactive Microgrid System Model
We describe a basic system model of decentralized transactive
IoT microgrids. We discuss the following components: a dis-
tributed ledger for recording transactions, a bid storage service
that facilitates finding trade partners, a microgrid controller for
regulating the microgrid load, and smart meters for measuring
the prosumers’ energy production and consumption.
Communication anonymity (e.g., onion routing)
Distributed ledger (e.g., blockchain)
Transaction anonymity
(mixing service) Bid storage
Active
smart meter
Anonymous trading
workflow for prosumers Microgrid controller
Figure 1. Architecture of a decentralized transactive microgrid with
PETra.
Figure 1 shows a decentralized transactive microgrid with
PETra. In this figure, components marked in blue are basic
elements of the decentralized transactive microgrid, while
components marked in red are added (or extended) by PETra.
Distributed Ledger
This ledger permanently stores transactions that specify energy
trades, change regulatory policies for the microgrid, etc. For
providing security and safety, it is crucial that transactions
be immutable, i.e., after a transaction has been recorded, it
cannot be modified or removed from the ledger. To enhance
fault tolerance, however, the ledger should also be distributed.
Since a distributed ledger is maintained by multiple nodes, a
key requirement is reaching consensus on which transactions
are valid and stored on the ledger. Moreover, this consensus
must be reached quickly and reliably, even in the presence of
faulty or malicious (e.g., compromised) ledger nodes. This
paper assumes that a distributed ledger service is available, but
makes no assumptions about the ledger implementation, such
as the particulars of the consensus algorithm. In practice, a
distributed ledger can be implemented using, e.g., blockchains
with proof-of-stake consensus or a practical Byzantine fault
tolerance algorithm [3].
Bid Storage Service
Although prosumers trade energy with each other directly (i.e.,
without a middleman), for the sake of scalability, we need a
service that enables prosumers to find trade partners. We as-
sume that there is a bid storage service that allows prosumers
to post and read energy bids and asks.2 This service relieves
prosumers from contacting a large number of potential trade
partners since they only communicate with the service to dis-
cover trade partners. To enhance scalability and reliability,
this service can also be implemented in a distributed manner,
using multiple nodes.
Microgrid Controller (Distribution System Operator)
We assume the existence of a controller at the DSO level that
regulates the total load that the microgrid should present to
the distribution system. The controller first predicts load in
the microgrid based on (1) bids and asks in the bid storage
and (2) outstanding energy trades in the ledger. By combining
this information with the prediction for the rest of the grid, the
controller produces a control signal that specifies how much
the microgrid load should be decreased or increased. Based on
this signal, the controller then updates the price policy for the
microgrid to influence energy production and consumption.
We also assume the presence of a secondary controller that
balances voltage and frequency in the microgrid.
Smart Meters
To measure the prosumers’ energy production and consump-
tion, a smart meter must be deployed at each prosumer. In
practice, these smart meters must be tamper resistant to pre-
vent prosumers from “stealing electricity” by tampering with
their meters. After a smart meter has measured the net amount
of energy consumed by the prosumer in some time interval, it
can send this information to the DSO for billing purposes.
Requirements
We now discuss the security, safety, and privacy requirements
that must be satisfied by a transactive energy IoT system.
Security
Security requirements ensure primarily that prosumers are
billed correctly, but they also provide necessary prerequisite
properties for safety. More specifically, they require that
• prosumers are billed correctly based on the energy prices
set by the DSO, their energy trades, and their actual energy
production and consumption measured by the smart meters,
• prosumers or outside attackers cannot change microgrid
regulatory policies that are set by the DSO,
• prosumers cannot back out of trades unilaterally, and they
cannot tamper with other prosumers’ trading or bidding,
• financial and physical impact of compromised or faulty
nodes is limited, and nodes can be banned by the DSO.
2A bid is an offer to buy at a certain price, while an ask is an offer to
sell at a certain price.
Safety
A careless or malicious prosumer may destabilize the grid by
promising to produce (or consume) a large amount of energy,
but failing to actually produce (or consume) it. A significant
difference between promised and actual energy production (or
consumption) can result in a large gap between the aggregate
production and consumption of the microgrid. A large gap
threatens the stability of not only the microgrid but also the
main power grid. Therefore, prosumers should not be able to
trade large amounts of energy that they are unlikely to deliver.
Specifically, we require that
• the net amount of energy sold (or bought) by a prosumer is
upper bounded (by a limit set by the DSO), where the net
amount of energy sold is the difference between the amount
of energy sold and bought by the prosumer, and the net
amount of energy bought is defined analogously.
In practice, the DSO can set the limits based on the prosumers’
production and consumption capacities.
Privacy
Privacy requirements ensure that the prosumers’ privacy is
not compromised when they participate in energy trading.
We use non-transactive smart metering as a baseline, and we
require that the transactive system does not leak any additional
information compared to this baseline. More specifically, we
require that
• only the corresponding smart meter and the DSO may gain
information regarding the amount of energy produced, con-
sumed, bought, or sold by a prosumer,3
• only the prosumer may know which bids and asks it has
posted, and no one can know who traded energy with whom.
PRIVACY-PRESERVING ENERGY TRANSACTIONS
This section describes Privacy-preserving Energy Transac-
tions (PETra), which is our solution for providing privacy to
prosumers in a transactive energy IoT system, without com-
promising grid safety and security.
Overview of the Trading Workflow
We now provide a semi-formal description of the energy trad-
ing workflow from the prosumers’ perspective. Subsequent
subsections describe the assets, transactions, and services used
for trading in more detail.
Energy Selling Workflow
Consider a prosumer who wishes to sell energy to another
prosumer, as shown in Figure 2. As its first step, the prosumer
withdraws an energy production asset from its smart meter.
An energy production asset represents a permission to sell
a certain amount of energy, and it is used to enforce safety
requirements. If the prosumer has sufficient unsold production
capacity, the smart meter creates and transfers a production
asset to the prosumer using a smart meter transaction 1 ,
which is recorded on the distributed ledger.
At this point, the production asset can still be traced back to
the prosumer since the ledger is public. To achieve anonymity,
3Although this requirement is impossible to satisfy if all other pro-
sumers may collude against one target, we can assume that the ma-
jority of prosumers are non-colluding.
smart meter prosumer mixing
service
prosumer
(anonymous address)
bid
storage
other prosumer
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(anonymous address)
smart meter
(anonymous address)
1 energy
production asset
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production asset
3 energy
production asset 4 energy production asset,
energy ask
energy
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5 financial asset,
energy consumption asset
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Figure 2. Simplified overview of the flow of assets from the perspective of a prosumer who sells energy. Note that to prevent de-anonymization, a
prosumer should use multiple addresses and multiple rounds of mixing, which we have omitted from the figure for clarity of presentation.
the prosumer uses a mixing service, which could be imple-
mented as a decentralized protocol, such as CoinShuffle [22]
or Xim [2]. The prosumer transfers the production asset to the
mixing service using an energy and financial transaction 2 ,
which is also recorded on the distributed ledger. In turn, the
mixing service transfers the production asset to an anonymous
address 3 , which is randomly generated and controlled by
the prosumer.4 Since the mixing service transfers assets from
multiple prosumers to multiple anonymous addresses at the
same time, and the anonymous addresses were generated at
random by the prosumers, the assets cannot be traced back to
the original prosumers after mixing.5
The prosumer can now engage in energy trading anonymously.
To find a trade partner, it can either post an energy ask on the
bid storage, or simply search the storage for an acceptable
energy bid. To post an energy ask, the prosumer first proves to
the storage service—without revealing its original identity—
that it owns a production asset stored at an anonymous address.
Proving ownership prevents the prosumer from “spamming”
the storage service with bogus asks. The prosumer can then
post the energy ask 4 , which contains an anonymous commu-
nication identifier6, a price, and a reference to the production
asset. If another prosumer, who is seeking to buy energy,
finds the ask acceptable it can contact the seller using the
communication identifier included in the ask.
The seller and buyer can execute the trade by creating an
energy and financial transaction together 5 , and recording
it on the ledger. This transaction transfers the production
asset from the seller to the buyer, and a financial asset and
an energy consumption asset from the buyer to the seller. A
financial asset represents a certain amount of money, while
a consumption asset represents a permission to buy a certain
amount of energy, which is used to enforce safety requirements
similarly to production assets.
Finally, the selling prosumer deposits the financial and con-
sumption assets to its smart meter using an energy and finan-
cial transaction. To ensure that the prosumer remains anony-
4The concept of address varies between distributed ledgers, but
PETra could be implemented using any popular blockchain, such
as Bitcoin and Ethereum. Specifically, we use the term address to
denote a possible destination for asset transfers. Assets that have
been transferred to an address can be used only by someone who
“controls” the address (typically, the one who generated it), which
usually means knowing a private key that corresponds to the address.
5Note that prosumers should divide their assets between multiple
anonymous addresses; otherwise, each asset might be traced back to
its prosumer based on the amount of energy that it contains.
6We discuss communication anonymity later.
mous, it transfers the assets to an anonymous address that
is randomly generated and controlled by the smart meter 6 .
Once the smart meter has received the assets, it credits the
financial amount to and deducts the energy amount from the
prosumer for billing purposes. To enforce safety requirements,
the prosumer is required to always deposit the same amount of
consumption assets as the amount of production assets with-
drawn at the beginning; otherwise, unaccounted assets could
be used to trade excessive amounts.
Energy Buying Workflow
Consider a prosumer who would like to buy energy from
another prosumer. Since the trading workflow is very similar
to the case of the selling prosumer, we will discuss only the
differences. In the first step, the prosumer tries to withdraw a
financial asset and an energy consumption asset from its smart
meter. If the prosumer has the consumption capacity and good
financial standing, the smart meter transfers the assets to the
prosumer and adds the financial amount to the prosumer’s bill.
After transferring the assets through a mixing service, the pro-
sumer is ready to post an energy bid on the bid service. To do
so, it first proves the ownership of both the financial asset and
the consumption asset to the service, and then posts the energy
bid, which includes an anonymous communication identifier.
If a partner is found, the trade is executed as described above,
with the prosumer playing the role of the buyer this time.
Finally, the prosumer deposits the purchased energy produc-
tion asset to the anonymous address of its smart meter, which
credits the energy amount to the prosumer, for billing purposes.
Note that if the prosumer has not spent all of its financial as-
sets, then the remainder may also be deposited back to the
smart meter.
Transactions
The previous subsection gave an overview of how PETra uses
transactions in the trading workflow to transfer various assets.
We now describe the format of these transactions, as well as the
rules that they have to satisfy to be valid and recorded on the
ledger. We also introduce and detail regulatory transactions,
which the DSO uses to regulate the microgrid.
Timing
The ability to specify points or intervals in time is crucial.
For example, control signals specify how the microgrid load
should change at certain points in time, energy trades specify
when energy will be consumed or produced, etc. To facili-
tate representing signals and transactions, we divide time into
fixed-length intervals, and specify points or periods in time
using these discrete timesteps. The length of the time interval
is determined based on the timing assumptions of the physical
power system. For example, the default length of the time in-
terval may be 4 seconds, which corresponds to how frequently
the control signal of the DSO typically changes.
Assets
Before we can discuss transactions, we need to define the
format of the three types of assets that these transactions may
transfer. First, an energy production asset (EPA) is defined by
• power: non-negative amount of power to be produced (for
example, measured in watts),
• start: first time interval in which energy is to be produced,
• end: last time interval in which energy is to be produced.
Second, an energy consumption asset (ECA) is defined by
the same fields. For this asset, however, the fields define
energy consumption instead of production. Finally, a financial
asset (FA) is defined by a single non-negative number amount,
which can be denominated in either a fiat currency (e.g., Euros
or US dollars) or a cryptocurrency (e.g., Bitcoin or Ether).
Energy and Financial Transactions
Energy and financial transactions transfer energy and financial
assets from one address to another. Prosumers can use these
transactions for multiple purposes, e.g., to trade energy by
exchanging assets with other prosumers, to prove to the bid
storage service that they possess an asset, to hide their identity
by transferring assets to and from mixing services, and to
deposit assets at their smart meter. An energy and financial
transaction contains the following fields:
• EPA_in: list of EPA inputs, each of which is defined by
– out: reference to an EPA output of a previous transaction,
– sig: signature of the referenced output’s address,
• ECA_in: list of ECA inputs (i.e., list of (out, sig) pairs),
• FA_in: list of FA inputs (i.e., list of (out, sig) pairs),
• EPA_out: list of EPA outputs, each of which is defined by
– EPA: an energy production asset,
– address: address to which EPA is transferred,
• ECA_out: list of ECA outputs (i.e., (ECA, address) pairs),
• FA_out: list of FA outputs (i.e., (ECA, address) pairs).
This transaction transfers the assets specified in the input lists
to the addresses specified in the output lists. Input and output
lists may differ in length, so one asset may be divided into
multiple assets, and multiple assets may be combined into one.
An energy and financial transaction is valid (and can be
recorded on the ledger) if the following three conditions hold.
• None of the outputs referenced by the inputs have been
spent by a transaction that has been recorded on the ledger.
• All signatures are valid, which ensures that an asset can be
transferred only by its current owner.
• For each asset type (and for each timestep), the sums of the
input and output assets are equal. For example, in the case
of energy production assets, the condition is
∀t : ∑ out ∈ EPA_out:
out.EPA.start≤ t≤out.EPA.end
out.EPA.power
= ∑ in ∈ EPA_in:
in.out.EPA.start≤ t≤ in.out.EPA.end
in.out.EPA.power.
The conditions for consumption and financial assets can be
described formally in similar ways.
Smart-Meter Transactions
Prosumers use smart-meter transactions to withdraw energy
and financial assets from their own smart meters, before they
engage in trading. A transaction contains the following fields:
• EPA_out: list of EPA outputs (see above),
• ECA_out: list of ECA outputs (see above),
• FA_out: list of FA outputs (see above),
• id: smart meter’s identifier,
• sig: smart meter’s signature over the transaction.
This transaction creates and transfers the assets to the pro-
sumer’s addresses, which are specified in the output lists.
The smart meter signs the transaction only if the prosumer
is allowed to withdraw these assets. More specifically, the
amount of assets withdrawn can never exceed certain limits
that are set by the DSO. For example, in the case of EPA, the
following condition must be satisfied for prosumer i:
∀t : ∑
tr∈STRi
∑
out∈ tr.EPA_out:
out.EPA.start≤t≤out.EPA.end
out.EPA.power< MAXEPAi,
where STRi is the set of smart-meter transactions created for
prosumer i, and MAXEPAi is the withdrawal limit. The condi-
tion for consumption assets is similar, based on a withdrawal
limit MAXECAi. For financial assets, the smart meter can take
into account the amounts withdrawn and deposited, as well as
the outside bill payments to the DSO.
A transaction is valid if the following two conditions hold.
• The smart meter identified in the transaction has been au-
thorized (and not been banned) by regulatory transactions.
• The smart meter’s signature is valid (for the smart meter’s
public key, see regulatory transactions).
Regulatory Transactions
The DSO uses regulatory transactions for two purposes: (1) to
manage the set of authorized smart meters and (2) to change
the price policy. First, whenever a new smart meter is installed,
the DSO notifies the microgrid by authorizing the device using
a regulatory transaction. Likewise, whenever a smart meter
is deactivated (e.g., because service is stopped or the device
is believed to be faulty or compromised), the DSO notifies
the microgrid by banning the device. Second, to influence
microgrid load, the DSO can set a price policy, which includes
a price at which prosumers may buy energy from the DSO and
a price at which they may sell energy to the DSO.
A regulatory transaction contains the following fields:
• authorize: list of smart meters to be authorized, each of
which is defined by
– id: identifier of the smart meter,
– pubkey: public key of the smart meter,
• ban: list of identifiers of smart meters to be banned,
• priceConsumption: price at which DSO sells energy,
• priceProduction: price at which DSO buys energy,
• time: timestep after which authorizations, bans, and price
changes should take effect,
• sig: DSO’s signature over the transaction.
A regulatory transaction of this type is valid if timestep is
not in the past and the DSO’s signature is valid. The active
prices for timestep t are given by the last regulatory transaction
recorded on the ledger whose time is less than t. Likewise,
regulatory transactions that are recorded on the ledger later
override the authorizations and bans of earlier transactions.
Services
We now describe the various services that are provided in
PETra. Earlier, we discussed the distributed ledger, which
permanently stores valid transactions. Below, we introduce
the anonymous communication service, the mixing service
for transaction anonymity, the anonymous bid storage, and
smart-meter based billing.
Communication Anonymity
The anonymous communication layer is the infrastructure
upon which all other anonymity services in PETra are built.
Without this communication layer, transactions and bids could
be easily de-anonymized based on their sources’ network iden-
tifiers (e.g., IP or MAC addresses).
We can employ well-known and widely used techniques for
anonymous communication, such as onion routing [21]. To
build an onion network, the smart meters, prosumers, and
other devices can act as onion routers, and the list of onion
routers in a microgrid can be published on the ledger. In
practice, this service can be built on the free and open-source
Tor software with private Directory Authorities. In this case,
anonymous communication identifiers in bids and asks corre-
spond to public-keys that identify Tor hidden services.
Transaction Anonymity
Communication anonymity is necessary, but not sufficient, for
anonymous trading. In particular, if prosumers used their own
accounts to transfer assets, their trades would not be anony-
mous. Fortunately, most distributed ledgers allow users to
easily generate new addresses at random, which are anony-
mous in the sense that no one can tell who generated them. If
prosumers simply transferred assets to these addresses, how-
ever, they could be easily de-anonymized by tracing the assets
back to the prosumers.
To prevent this de-anonymization, prosumers transfer assets to
their anonymous addresses through a mixing service. The mix-
ing service prevents tracing assets back to their original owners
by mixing together multiple incoming transfers and multiple
outgoing transfers. This service thus hides the connections
between the prosumers and the anonymous addresses.
A mixing service can be implemented using multiple ap-
proaches. The simplest one is to use a trusted third party,
called a cryptocurrency tumbler, which can receive and send
assets. Anonymity in this case, however, depends on the
trustworthiness and reliability of the third party, who could
easily de-anonymize the addresses. A more secure approach
is to use decentralized protocols, such as CoinShuffle [22] or
Xim [2]. These protocols enable participants to mix assets
with each other, thereby eliminating the need for a trusted third
party. Some newer cryptocurrencies, such as Zerocoin [17],
provide built-in mixing services, which are often based on
cryptographic principles and proofs.
Bidding Anonymity
Prosumers must also be able to anonymously post energy bids
and asks on the bid storage service. An anonymous bid (or
ask) contains an ECA (or EPA), a price, and an anonymous
communication identifier (e.g., Tor hidden service), which can
be used to contact the bidding (or asking) prosumer. To enforce
safety requirements, the bid storage service must verify that
the prosumer actually owns the asset to be traded. To this end,
the prosumer first has to prove that it controls the anonymous
address where the asset is stored, which can be performed in
multiple ways.
In many distributed ledgers, an address represents a public key,
and controlling means knowing the corresponding private key.
In this case, the prosumer can prove that it controls an address
by signing a challenge, which was freshly generated by the
service, with the private key of the address. Alternatively, the
prosumer may also prove control by transferring zero amount
of assets to a random address that was freshly generated by
the service.
Smart-Meter Based Billing
After a prosumer has finished trading, it deposits all of its
EPA, ECA, and FA to the smart meter by transferring them to
an anonymous address generated by the smart meter. Later,
during timeslot t, the smart meter measures the amount of
energy actually consumed (or produced) by the prosumer using
physical sensors. The meter can then compute the prosumer’s
bill for timeslot t, which will be paid to the DSO, as follows.
The energy consumption balance Eti of prosumer i is
Eti = measured net energy consumption during timeslot t
− ∑
epa∈{EPA deposited by i}: epa.start≤ t≤epa.end
epa.power
+ ∑
epa∈{EPA withdrawn by i}: epa.start≤ t≤epa.end
epa.power.
Notice that consumption assets are not used directly for billing,
they are only used to enforce security and safety requirements.
The bill Bti of prosumer i for timeslot t, which will be paid by
the prosumer to the DSO, is
Bti =FA withdrawn by i during t−FA deposited by i during t
+
{−Eti ·priceProduction if Eti < 0
Eti ·priceConsumption otherwise,
where priceProduction and priceConsumption are the
prices set by the latest regulatory transactions for timeslot t.
DISCUSSION
This section presents a semi-formal analysis of PETra and
shows that it satisfies the security, safety, and privacy require-
ments formulated earlier.
Security
Satisfaction of the security requirements follows from:
• immutability of transactions in the distributed ledger,
• validity conditions of the transactions, which include condi-
tions on both signatures and asset balances,
• and tamper-resistance of smart meters.
Together, these properties ensure that only the right entities
may create and sign a transaction, that transactions adhere to
the rules of the trading workflow, and that transactions cannot
be tampered with.7
Safety
We now demonstrate that faulty or malicious prosumers cannot
trade excessive amounts of energy if normal prosumers follow
the rules of the trading workflow. First, we can show that the
net amount of energy sold by prosumer i for each timestep
is at most MAXEPAi. Due to the rules of the trading workflow,
the gross amount of energy sold is less than or equal to the
amount of EPA obtained by prosumer i. A prosumer can
obtain EPA either by withdrawing from its smart meter or
by purchasing from another prosumer. From its smart meter,
prosumer i can withdraw at most MAXEPAi. Although the
prosumer may also buy EPA from another prosumer, this
constitutes buying energy, which decreases the net amount of
energy sold with the same amount. Hence, the net amount
of energy sold by prosumer i cannot exceed MAXEPAi. By
extending the argument, we can show that the net amount
of energy sold by a group of prosumers G cannot exceed
∑i∈G MAXEPAi. Similarly, the net amount of energy bought by
a group of prosumers G cannot exceed ∑i∈G MAXECAi.
Privacy
Due to our use of communication anonymity and mixing ser-
vices, members of a microgrid can observe only the amount of
assets withdrawn by a prosumer from its smart meter. Since
all trading transactions are anonymous, they do not reveal the
actual amount of assets traded by the prosumer. If a prosumer
has not traded away all of its assets, then it can also anony-
mously deposit the remainder to a random address that was
freshly generated by its smart meter. Even if a prosumer does
not wish to trade, it should always withdraw, mix, and deposit
the same amount of assets. Otherwise, the lack (or varying
amount) of withdrawal would leak information.
As for the DSO, it receives the same information from the
smart meter as in a non-transactive smart grid (i.e., amount of
energy produced and consumed). Since trading is anonymous,
the DSO learns only the financial balance of the prosumer,
which is necessary for billing. However, we can provide an
even higher-level of privacy. In particular, since price poli-
cies are recorded on the ledger (which the smart meters may
read), each prosumer’s smart meter may calculate and send
the prosumer’s monthly bill to the DSO, without revealing the
prosumer’s energy consumption or production. Meanwhile,
the DSO can still obtain detailed load information (including
predictions) for the microgrid from the bid storage and the
trades recorded on the ledger.
RELATED WORK
New privacy concerns arise with the continuing adoption of
smart grids. In addition to old and new security threats (such
as energy theft and smart-meter malware), McDaniel and
McLaughlin discuss the privacy concerns of energy usage
profiling that smart grids could potentially enable [15]. Sev-
eral approaches have been investigated as potential means to
provide privacy protections for smart grid users.
7Due to lack of space, we leave a detailed discussion and proof for
future work.
Some approaches look to the use of protocols and/or frame-
works to help protect privacy. Rajagopalan et al. use tools
from information theory to present a framework that abstracts
both the privacy and the utility requirements of smart-meter
data [19, 23]. Their framework leads to a novel tractable
privacy-utility tradeoff problem with minimal assumptions.
Efthymiou and Kalogridis describe a method for securely
anonymizing frequent electrical metering data sent by a smart
meter [6]. Their approach is based on the observation that fre-
quent metering data may be required by an energy distribution
network for operational reasons, but it may not necessarily
need to be attributable to a specific smart meter. The authors
describe a method that provides a third-party escrow mecha-
nism for authenticated anonymous meter readings, which are
hard to associate with a particular smart meter.
Other approaches, such as additional hardware components,
have also been explored for potential privacy gains. Varodayan
and Khisti study using a rechargeable battery for partially pro-
tecting the privacy of information contained in a household’s
electrical load profile [26]. They show that stochastic battery
policies may leak 26% less information than a best-effort pol-
icy, which holds the output load constant whenever possible.
Tan et al. study privacy in a smart metering system from an
information theoretic perspective in the presence of energy
harvesting and storage units [25]. They show that energy har-
vesting provides increased privacy by diversifying the energy
source, while a storage device can be used to increase both
energy efficiency and privacy.
PETra extends this work by (1) leveraging a decentralized IoT
system for transactive energy and (2) addressing the novel pri-
vacy threat posed by trading. In particular, while earlier work
protected the prosumers’ privacy from the DSO, PETra also
protects it from other prosumers, as well as outside attackers.
A key element of PETra is its ability to distribute information
among peers via blockchains. As blockchain technology devel-
ops and matures, new frameworks, services, and protocols are
being developed to leverage the distributed ledgers provided
by blockchains. For example, Hyperledger Fabric is a platform
for distributed ledger solutions, which was designed to sup-
port pluggable implementations of different components [11].
Since this paper focuses on the theoretical foundations of
PETra, any of these ledgers provide the required capabilities.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
As the complexity of power systems increases due to the evo-
lution of power grids, decentralized transactive-energy IoT
systems are emerging to tackle this complexity. Ironically,
these decentralized systems also give rise to new privacy chal-
lenges, such as the potential leakage of energy usage patterns,
including the possibility of inferring the future state of a pro-
sumer. These challenges are exacerbated by the stringent
safety and security requirements of power systems.
This paper describes Privacy-preserving Energy Transactions
(PETra), our innovative solution for anonymous energy trad-
ing within a transactive microgrid. PETra builds on dis-
tributed ledgers, such as blockchains, and proven techniques
for anonymity, such as mixing services and onion routing.
We described the workflow of anonymous energy trading and
explained the novel transactions and services used in PETra.
Finally, we discussed how PETra satisfies security, safety, and
privacy requirements. In future work, we will provide rigorous
proofs of satisfying these requirements.
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